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legal and legislative issues
Few issues in 
education have 
generated more 
ongoing controversy 
during the last 
half-century than 
affirmative action. 
Update: The Supreme Court 
and Affirmative Action
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.
Few issues in education have gener-ated more ongoing controversy during the last half-century than affirmative action. Supporters view 
it as a positive step to eliminate the effects 
of past discrimination. Conversely, critics 
speak of race-conscious policies that they 
maintain create greater problems by failing 
to address how granting preferences today 
remedies past inequities.
Although typically more contentious in 
higher education, affirmative action is the 
centerpiece of this column because of the 
impact that race-conscious policies can have 
on K–12 schools.
Legal History of Affirmative Action
“Affirmative action” was introduced into 
the national legal lexicon when President 
Kennedy issued an executive order in March 
1961 that primarily directed government 
contractors to “take affirmative action to 
ensure that applicants are employed and 
that employees are treated during employ-
ment without regard to their race, creed, 
color, or national origin.”
Following the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, affirmative action was enforced 
for the first time when President Lyndon B. 
Johnson signed Executive Order 11,246 in 
September 1965. This directive confirmed 
the government’s commitment by declar-
ing that it would take “affirmative action 
to ensure that applicants are employed . . . 
without regard to their race, creed, color or 
national origin” (3 C.F.R. Part 340, 1965).
In October 1967, President Johnson’s 
Executive Order 11,375 extended affirma-
tive action to women. That order expanded 
the definition of affirmative action to include 
“sex” (32 Fed. Reg. 14,303, 1965) in direct-
ing affirmative action policies to take “race, 
color, religion, sex, [and/]or national origin” 
into consideration in order to ensure compli-
ance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Litigation
Regardless of whether the practice is 
referred to as affirmative action or race-con-
scious policies, it has led to a steady supply 
of litigation that has reached the Supreme 
Court.
The Court’s first case on affirmative 
action, De Funis v. Odegaard (1974), was a 
dispute from Washington State. The justices 
vacated an order from state courts uphold-
ing the use of a race-conscious admissions 
policy in a public law school but chose not 
to address whether affirmative action was 
constitutionally permissible.
Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke (1978) was the first Supreme Court 
case on the merits of affirmative action. 
A divided Court reached two different 
outcomes, ruling that a medical school’s 
affirmative-action admissions policy was 
unconstitutional, yet forbidding any consid-
eration of race in admissions, allowing it to 
be used as a “plus” factor that may elevate 
one candidate over another.
The Supreme Court refused to allow 
race to be a factor in a case involving pub-
lic school teachers, finding in Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education (1989) that the 
layoffs of nonminorities based solely on race 
violated equal protection.
In Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), the Supreme 
Court reiterated that diversity can consti-
tute a compelling state interest. Even so, the 
justices invalidated an undergraduate admis-
sions policy as not narrowly tailored enough 
to achieve the state’s goal of achieving a 
diverse student body.
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) was a land-
mark case in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the affirmative-action admissions 
policy of the University of Michigan Law 
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School, ruling that the school had 
a compelling interest in promoting 
class diversity and that an admissions 
process that may favor “underrep-
resented minority groups” but that 
also considered other factors did not 
amount to a quota system.
Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District 
No.1 (PICS 2007) considered the 
use of race in admissions in K–12 
schools in Seattle, Washington, and 
Louisville, Kentucky. In PICS, the 
Court observed that Seattle neither 
operated racially segregated schools 
nor had ever been subject to a 
court-ordered desegregation order; 
Louisville was declared unitary, 
meaning that its schools were no lon-
ger segregated by race, and released 
from judicial supervision in 2000.
The Court decided that officials in 
both districts failed to demonstrate 
that the use of race in the student 
assignment plans was necessary to 
achieve their stated goals of racial 
diversity because they overlooked 
alternative approaches.
Fisher v. University of Texas
In Fisher v. University of Texas 
(2009), Abigail Fisher, a white 
high school student, filed a lawsuit 
contending that she was denied 
admission to the University of 
Texas-Austin in the fall of 2008 
because she was white. The state 
requires all students in the top 
10% of their high school classes to 
be admitted to state universities, 
but students who fall short of that 
threshold are admitted according to 
a formula that combines other fac-
tors, such as academic achievement, 
leadership, family circumstances, 
and race. Fisher’s lawsuit is based 
on a claim that any consideration of 
race by a university in admissions 
violates the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After a federal trial court in Texas 
and the Fifth Circuit agreed that the 
university’s consideration of race 
as a factor in admissions met the 
standards laid out in Grutter, the 
plaintiff requested a review by the 
higher court.
Justice Anthony Kennedy began by 
pointing out that university officials 
treated race as one of a variety of 
factors in the admissions process in 
pursuit of a critical mass of minority 
students and thus identified the issue 
as the Court being asked to review 
whether the Fifth Circuit’s order was 
consistent with its decisions interpret-
ing the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, including 
Grutter v. Bollinger. After deter-
mining that the Fifth Circuit failed 
to apply strict scrutiny, the highest 
level of constitutional analysis, as 
mandated by Grutter and Bakke, the 
Court remanded Fisher for further 
consideration.
Justice Kennedy indicated that 
while the justices agreed that 
university officials demonstrated 
that—consistent with Grutter—
diversity was a compelling interest 
that was essential to the university’s 
mission, they failed to devise a 
plan that was narrowly tailored to 
achieve their goal without using a 
race-conscious remedy.
Justice Kennedy next explained 
that institutional officials can no 
longer define diversity as “some spec-
ified percentage of a particular group 
merely because of its race or ethnic 
origin [since t]hat would amount 
to outright racial balancing, which 
is patently unconstitutional” (p. 
2419). He indicated that the judiciary 
must be convinced that officials cre-
ated admissions processes designed 
to “ensure that each applicant is 
evaluated as an individual and not in 
a way that makes an applicant’s race 
or ethnicity the defining feature of his 
or her application” (p. 2418, citing 
Grutter at 337).
Rounding out the Supreme Court’s 
opinion, Justice Kennedy declared 
that officials must demonstrate that 
“no workable race neutral alterna-
tives would produce the educational 
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benefi ts of diversity” (p. 2420), a 
standard that the Fifth Circuit mis-
takenly failed to apply. The Court 
thus directed the Fifth Circuit to 
apply the correct standard of review.
Refl ections
For supporters of affi rmative action, 
Fisher can be described as a kind 
of half-loaf outcome. On the one 
hand, the Supreme Court recognized 
diversity as a compelling govern-
ment interest. On the other hand, 
although the Court found that 
university offi cials failed to devise a 
plan that was suffi ciently narrowly 
tailored to achieve their goal, it did 
not explicitly forbid the use of race 
as a factor in admissions policies.
Still, in directing offi cials to prove 
that they have compelling interests if 
they take race into consideration in 
admissions—regardless of whether 
programs are in K–12 schools or 
higher education—the result in 
Fisher is likely to make it more dif-
fi cult for administrators to do so.
Educators would be wise to take 
into account alternative factors, such 
as family socioeconomic status, when 
providing programming for quali-
fi ed students. By considering family 
socioeconomic status when providing 
programming for qualifi ed students 
from lower- and middle-income 
backgrounds, educational institu-
tions may better serve the neediest 
and most deserving applicants while 
establishing pools that are more 
diverse on a variety of levels.
In K-12 schools in particular, 
socioeconomic status is something 
for school business offi cials, their 
boards, and other education leaders 
to think about if their students apply 
for admission or if state laws allow 
them to work with charter schools 
within their districts.
An additional benefi t of taking 
socioeconomic status into account is 
that if it is used to expand the crite-
ria for achieving diversity in student 
bodies, then affi rmative action might 
become more palatable to its crit-
ics by helping create larger pools of 
applicants. To this end, it is unfor-
tunate that rather than establish 
criteria for reviewing the constitu-
tionality of race-based admissions 
policies, the Fisher Court left this 
issue up to the institution’s offi cials 
by returning the dispute to the Fifth 
Circuit for further consideration.
Another shortcoming in Fisher 
is that the Supreme Court failed to 
provide clear standards to guide 
admissions offi cers, such as requiring 
them to take a student socioeco-
nomic status into consideration 
or directing them to explain how 
much weight they assign to racial 
qualifi cations when evaluating appli-
cations. By simply declaring that the 
university policy failed to provide 
a compelling interest in pursuit of 
diversifying its student body, the 
Court inadvertently set the stage for 
additional litigation.
Conclusion
As is typically the case when deal-
ing with contentious issues, Fisher 
is unlikely to be the last word on 
race-conscious policies. In fact, since 
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, in dis-
putes from Michigan and California, 
respectively, reached different results 
on the use of race in education and 
other arenas, the Supreme Court has 
stepped into the fray.
The Supreme Court has agreed 
to review the case from Michigan, 
wherein the Sixth Circuit invalidated 
a voter-approved state constitutional 
amendment that forbade offi cials at 
public colleges and universities, ele-
mentary and secondary schools, and 
other arenas from granting racial 
preferences. Since this case from 
Michigan is on the docket for the 
Court’s 2013-2014 term, this dispute 
bears watching because it is likely to 
provide further guidance about the 
role of race in education.
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